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Because of alleged deficiencies of the tort system as a means of dealing 
with personal injury accidents,l there continues to be great interest in New 
Zealand's no-fault ac.cident compensation scheme as a possible alternative 
to civil actions under the tort system.2 
The New Zealand scheme, first adopted in 1972, provided benefits, 
without requiring any proof of fault, to persons suffering "injury by 
accident".3 These benefits included medical and rehabilitative expenses, 
compensation for 80 per cent of lost earnings as long as disability contin-
ued; and lump sum payments of up to $27,000 for non-economic losses, 
as well as other necessary expenses.4 The most significant feature of the 
scheme, however, provided that where the scheme provided "cover" 
where a person suffered "injury by accident" the right to bring a civil 
action in tort for damages was abolished.5 
The New Zealand scheme has been regarded, as W F Birch, New 
Zealand's Minister of Labour, has pointed out, as "one ofthe world's most 
advanced schemes for compensating the victims of accidents ... ".6 But the 
current New Zealand Government, a National rather than a Labour Gov-
ernment, since taking power has also imposed what Minister Birch has 
characterized as "the most radical reforms to the accident compensation 
scheme since it first provided cover in 1974".7 Most of these reforms took 
effect on 1 July 1992. 
It is the purpose of this paper to describe the more significant changes 
to the scheme made by the National Government and to analyse the likely 
effects of these changes.8 
First, however, it is important to note that there has been a clearly 
identifiable change in the underlying philosophy of accident compensation. 
* BS and JD, Boston University; LLM'Yaie University; Professor of Law, The William S 
Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
This article was written for Volume 16, Number 4 of the Hiroshima Law Journal in honour of 
the retirement of Professor Hiroyuki Hata, former Dean, from the Hiroshima University Faculty 
of Law. It is printed here with the permission of the Editors of the Hiroshima University Law 
Journal. It is based upon a paper originally delivered at the Australasian Law Teachers 
Association Conference in Brisbane in July 1992. 
See Stephen D Sugarman, Doing Away With Personal Injury Law: New Compensation 
Mechanismfor Victims, Consumers, and Business (1989),1-72. 
2 See, for example, Masanobu Kato, Liability Damages to Social Insurance - Compensating 
Personal Injury Victims (1989). Law students in the United States are routinely exposed to 
alternatives to tort law, includin~ the New Zealand accident compensation scheme. See, eg 
Marc A Franklin & Robert L Rablll, Tort Law and Alternatives - Cases and Materials (4th Ed. 
1987) 749-54; James A Henderson Jr, & Richard N Pearson, The Torts Process (3rd ed. 1988), 
899-910; Jerry J Phillips et ai, Tort Law -Cases, Materials, Problems (1991), 1284-86. 
3 Accident Compensation Act 1982, [hereinafter ACA 1982] consolidating and amending the 
Accident Compensation Act 1972 and its amendments. 
4 ACA 1982. All dollar amounts are in New Zealand dollars. 
Ibid, s 27(1). 
6 Honourable Bill Birch, Accident Compensation - A Fairer Scheme (hereinafter A Fairer 
Scheme), in Preface, Letter from Hon W F Birch (1991). 
7 Ibid at 66. 
8 For my description and view of the New Zealand's scheme prior to the current amendments, 
see Richard S Miller, "The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme" (1989) 
11 U Haw L Rev 1 (hereinafter "The Future"). 
2 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 5, 1992] 
The first principle underlying the original scheme had been identified by 
Mr Justice Woodhouse, who may rightly be called the Father of the New 
Zealand accident compensation scheme, as community or collective re-
sponsibility (as opposed to individual responsibility.)9 In his view, the 
scheme was a program of social insurance; it was not a private insurance 
scheme. 10 
By contrast, the new Act is not considered by the Government to be a 
social welfare or social insurance scheme in concept. Instead, it is intended 
to become more like a scheme of accident insurance, II including premiums 
to be paid by individuals who will benefit from the scheme. This important 
change is reflected in the title ofthe new Act, the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (ARCIA), and in the new name of 
the Accident Compensation Corporation, the governmental body that 
operates the scheme, the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation In-
surance Corporation (ARCIC). It is also reflected in another change of 
language: charges against those who must pay for the scheme are no longer 
called "levies". They are now explicitly called "premiums".12 
I. THE RIGHT TO BRING A COMMON LAW ACTION 
As in the prior law, the most important feature of the new Act is that 
civil tort actions for compensatory damages for personal injuries may not 
be brought with regard to covered injuries. 13 It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that where coverage of an injury is excluded, the victim is not 
precluded from seeking to bring a civil tort action for damages in the court 
system; 14 a rule or a court decision of no coverage, therefore, opens the 
door to a possible claim for damages under the common law of torts. 
II. COVERAGE 
The prior Act covered' 'personal injury by accident" .15 Personal injury 
by accident, in tum, was defined to include "the physical and mental 
consequences of any such injury or of the accident"; 16 "medical, surgical, 
dental, or first aid misadventure", otherwise undefined; 17 "incapacity 
resulting from an occupational disease or industrial deafness", 18 as more 
specifically defined;19 and "actual bodily harm (including pregnancy and 
mental or nervous shock)" arising from acts or omissions which fit the 
description of certain sexual crimes.20 
An important difference is that the new Act explicitly seems to exclude 
cover for mental distress not associated with physical injury to the person 
9 Report ofthe Royal Commission ofInquiry, Compensationfor Personal Injury in New Zealand 
(1967),40 (hereinafter The Woodhouse Report). 
10 Law Commission Report No.4, Personal Injury: Prevention and Recovery - Report on the 
Accident Compensation Scheme (1988), 4-5 (hereinafter Report No.4). 
II A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 15. 
12 See ARCIA, s 134: "Levies paid or payable under the Accident Compensation Act 1982 shall 
be deemed to be premiums paid or payable for the purposes of this Act". 
I3 ARCIA, s 14. Civil actions at law to recover punitive or exemplary damages for outrageous 
conduct are still permitted. See Auckland City Council v Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732; 
Donselaar v Donselaar [1982]1 NZLR 97. 
14 See ibid. 
15 ACA 1982, s 26. 
16 Ibid, s 2(a)(i). 
17 Ibid at (ii). 
18 Ibid at (iii). 
19 Ibid at ss 28 and 29. 
20 Ibid at s 2(1). 
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seeking cover.21 That exclusion may result in a denial of cover in cases 
where tort actions to recover for intentional or negligent infliction of 
emotional distress may be allowed. 
Perhaps the most radical change to coverage is the extent to which the 
Act now seeks to spell out coverage for harms caused by something health 
care professionals did or failed to do. While the former Act merely stated 
that personal injury by accident included "medical, surgical, dental, or 
first aid misadventure" without further definition,22 the new Act includes 
a definition of medical misadventure that covers almost two pages.23 The 
result of all this, as I will explain,24 is that in cases in which claimants seek 
compensation for "medical misadventure", the proceedings are likely in 
most cases to tum into actions to prove medical negligence or malpractice. 
21 ARC/A, s 4: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, "personal injury" means the death of, or physical injuries to, 
a"person, and any mental injury suffered by that person which is an outcome of those physical 
injuries to that person ... (Emphasis added.). And see also s 8(3). 
22 SeeACA 1982, s 2(1). 
23 ARC/A, s 5: 
(1) For the purposes of the Act,-
"Medical error" means the failure of a registered health professional to observe a standard of 
care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances. It is not medical error solely 
because desir~d results are not achieved or because subsequent events show that different 
decisions might have produced better results; 
"Medical misadventure" means personal injury resulting from medical error or medical mishap; 
"Medical mishap" means an adverse consequence of treatment by a registered health 
professional, properly given, if -
(a) the likelihood of the adverse consequence of the treatment occurring is rare; and 
(b) the adverse consequence of the treatment is severe. 
(2) For the purposes of the defmition of the term "medical mishap", the likelihood that 
treatment of the kind that occurred would have the adverse consequence shall be rare only if 
the probability is that the adverse consequence would not occur in more than 1 percent of cases 
where that treatment is given. 
(3) Where the likelihood that an injury would occur is in the ordinary course rare, but is not 
rare having regard to the circumstances of the particular person, it shall not be medical mishap 
if the greater risk to the particular person injured -
(a) was known to that person; or 
(b) in the case ofa person who does not have legal capacity, was known to that person's parent, 
legal guardian, or welfare guardian, as the case may be, -
prior to the treatment. . 
(4) For the purposes of the definition of the term "medical mishap", the adverse consequences 
of treatment are severe only if they resuJt in death or 
(a) hospitalisation as an inpatient for more than 14 days; or 
(b) significant disability lasting for more than 28 days total; or 
(c) the person qualifying for an independence allowance under section 54 of this Act. 
(5) Medical misadventure does not include personal injury arising from abnormal reaction of 
a patient or later complication arising from treatment procedures unless medical misadventure 
occurred at the time of the procedure. 
(6) A failure to obtain informed consent to treatment from the person on whom the treatment 
is performed or that person's parent, le~al guardian, or welfare guardian, as the case may be, 
is medical misadventure only if the regIstered health professional acted negligently in failing 
to obtain informed consent. 
(7) Medical misadventure does not include a failure to diagnose correctly the medical condition 
of any person or a failure to provide treatment unless that failure is negligent. 
(8) Medical misadventure does not include any personal injury resulting from the carrying out 
of any drug trial or clinical trial where the injured person has agreed in writing to participate in 
the trial. 
(9) In making any decision under this section the Corporation shall obtain and have regard to 
independent advice in accordance with procedures prescribed by regulations under this Act. 
(10) Where the Corporation considers that medical misadventure may be attributable to 
negligence or an inappropriate action on the part of a registered health professional it shall -
(a) give the registered health professional a reasonable opportunity to comment on the matter; 
and " 
(b) if satisfied that there may have been negligence or inappropriate action 
report the circumstances to the appropriate body with a view to the institution of disciplinary 
proceedings, and to any other body that may be appropriate. " 
24 See text at nn 91-103, below. 
4 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 5, 1992] 
III. BENEFITS 
There have been significant changes in the benefits. 
1. Earnings-related compensation. 
It should be noted first, however, that earnings-related compensation, 
measured as 80 per cent of lost earnings, remain in place.25 Further, as in 
the former Act,26 the employer pays for the first week if the injury is a work 
injury,27 and ARCIC pays for all earners' injuries, on or off the job, after 
the first week.28 The maximum amount payable as compensation for loss 
of earnings is $1,179 per week. 29 
2. Lump sums for loss or impairment of bodily function and for 
non-economic losses eliminated. 
Perhaps the most important and controversial change, one that was 
supported by the Labour Government and by the Law Commission,30 is 
the elimination of both lump-sum payments for permanent loss or impair-
ment of bodily function, which in the 1982 Act could reach $17,000,31 
and lump-sum payments for loss "of amenities or capacity for enjoying 
life, including loss from disfigurement; and ... [p Jain and suffering, 
including nervous shock and neurosis", of up to $10,000.32 Together, 
these items had constituted a significant part of the cost of the accident 
compensation scheme.33 The elimination of these non-economic losses 
moves the scheme away from its historical roots as a substitute for the 
civil tort action. 
3. Independence allowance created. 
In place of the these payments, the new Act provides for an "inde-
pendence allowance" based upon the degree of the claimant's disability 
and commencing not earlier than thirteen weeks after the injury for which 
it is paid.34 The allowance is $40 per week, paid quarterly, for a person 
with 100 percent disability, to be scaled downward in accordance with 
regulations to be promulgated for those with lesser disability.35 The 
allowance is not paid to those with less than 10 percent disability. 36 Finally, 
under this provision the degree of a person's disability must be reassessed 
at intervals of not more than five years.37 
The purpose of the independence allowance, in the language of Mr 
Birch, Minister of Labour, is "to enable those injured to meet the addi-
tional costs arising from a ... disability during the remainder of their life". 38 
The relatively small amount provided is designed' 'to cover miscellaneous 
expenses associated with disability". 39 It is to be adjusted annually to 
25 ARCIA, s 39. 
26 ACA 1982, ss 57, 59. 
27 ARCIA, s 38. 
28 Ibid, s 39. 
29 Subject to annual adjustments to reflect "movements in average weekly earnings": ARCIA, 
ss 48 and 70. 
30 Report No.4, above, n 10, at 21. 
31 ACA 1982, s 78. 
32 Ibid, s 79. 
33 See Law Commission Report No.4, above, n 10, at xiv. 
34 ARCIA, s 54(1) and (2). 
35 Ibid, (3) and (4). 
36 Ibid, (I). 
37 Ibid, (11). 
38 A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 47. 
39 Ibid at 49. 
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reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index.4o This payment cannot be 
converted to a lump sumY 
In addition to the independence allowance, additional expenses and 
costs for care, for purchase or modification of motor vehicles, for modify-
ing a residence, for household help, for child care, and for wheelchairs and 
other necessary equipment or appliances will be covered, as in the prior 
Act,42 as part of the rehabilitation of the accident victim.43 
4. Permanency of incapacity may be re-evaluated. 
An important change, at least from the perspectives of both moral hazard 
and rehabilitation, is the elimination of the provision in the former Act that 
prohibited the earnings-related compensation of a person determined to be 
permanently incapacitated from ever being reduced.44 This provision was 
designed to encourage permanently disabled workers to seek rehabilita-
tion, though it may have led some workers to feign permanent incapacity. 
Section 61 of the new Act requires periodic reassessments at intervals of 
not less than six months unless ARCIC "is satisfied that no purpose would 
be served by a further assessment" .45 
5. Earnings related compensation may not be used as a substitute 
for unemployment compensation. 
Even more significant is a provision in the new law which prevents the 
accident compensation scheme from being used, at least after the first 
twelve months following the incapacity, as unemployment compensation. 
By virtue of section 59(2)46 of the former Act, claimants who were able 
to return to work, though not necessarily in their previous occupations, 
would continue to receive earnings-related compensation if there was no 
"appropriate" work available. In view of the serious recession in New 
Zealand, this provision evidently became very expensive: Mr Birch 
estimated that it was costing $40 million per year in recent years.47 Under 
the new Act, there is a grace period of twelve months after the incapacity 
started, but if at that time the worker is determined to have a capacity for 
work of85 percent or more, eligibility for earnings-related compensation 
ceases irrespective of whether suitable employment opportunities are 
available.48 
6. Loss of earning capacity of non-earners. 
A feature of the prior Acts that had been criticized was the treatment of 
non-earners who became accidentvictims.49 Children under 16 or in school 
or apprenticeship programs who were injured were allowed minimal 
earnings-related compensation based to some extent on lost earning capac-
ity.5o But housewives who had taken time out of their profession or outside 
occupation in order to raise a family and other non-earners were not 
entitled to earnings-related compensation based on their lost earning 
capacity. The new Act purports to deal with that problem by allowing 
40 ARCIA, 5 71. 
41 Ibid at 5 74(1). 
42 ACA 1982,537. 
43 ARCIA, 5 26, under the title" Social Rehabilitation" . 
44 ACA 1982,560(5). 
45 ARCIA, 5 61(4). 
46 Added in 1985. 
47 A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 43. 
48 ARCIA, 549. 
49 See "The Future", above, n 8, at 8. 
50 cfACA 1982,5562 and 63. 
6 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 5, 1992] 
certain persons to pay premiums to purchase the right to receive compen-
sation for lost earning capacity in the event of an accident.51 
7. Medical and health benefits. 
One of the problems complained of under the prior Act was that accident 
victims had access to expensive and often preferred private hospitals and 
other private medical and surgical services not available to victims of 
illness under the public health system.52 This created an incentive for 
doctors and patients to classify illnesses as accidents.53 Another problem 
was that patients who were charged little or nothing for their health care 
had little motivation or incentive to keep costs low.54 
Recognizing these problems,55 the Government has evidently inaugu-
rated "user part charges" for publicly funded health care and required, or 
intends to promulgate regulations to require, accident victims to "pay user 
charges for pharmaceuticals, laboratory diagnostic tests and some public 
hospital services on the same basis as the sick", and also to require them 
to "pay the same targeted user charges for general practitioner visits as the 
sick" .56 With regard to private hospitals and other health care provisions 
the Government will increase beneficiaries' charges by reducing the 
maximum that ARCIC can pay:57 
IV. FUNDING AND DETERRENCE 
Apart from the change of label for philosophical purposes from "lev-
ies" to "premiums", already mentioned, there are some significant 
changes wrought by the new Act both in the way that the scheme will be 
funded and in the way that premiums will be allocated and adjusted to 
internalize costs to accident causers. 
1. The former Act. 
Under the former Act, levies on employers covered both work and non-
work related accidents of earners, levies on motor vehicles covered motor 
vehicle accidents, and general taxes covered accidents to non-earners.58 
Levies on employers varied according to the past accident cost experience of 
the industrial group into which each employer fell; levies on motor vehicles 
51 ARC/A, s 45. The new provision, however, seems inadequate to the task. First, it only applies 
to those who have been earners, who have had 12 months continuous employment, and who 
make the election while still employed or within a month after ceasing to be employed. Second, 
the amount to be treated as earnings must be specified, and that amount may be either "the 
weekly earnings of the person calculated under this Act as if the incapacity of the person 
commenced more than 5 weeks before the date of the election" or a lesser amount. Third, 
compensation under this provision shall be for a maximum of five years from the date of the 
incapacity irrespective of how long the incapacity actually continues. And fourth, the amount 
of the premiums charged will be determined' 'with the objective of there being sufficient in 
any year to meet the full costs of the compensation payable under this section in that year and . 
future years for any claims. made under this section in respect of personal injury suffered in that 
year and the costs of administration of this section in that year". A less generous provision can 
hardly be imagined. Certainly this provision offers little to compensate an injured housewife 
who earned professional competence by virtue of her education but who was either working at 
an entry level position when she elected to purchase the protection or could not under the highly 
restrictive requirements of this section purchase the election at all. 
52 Cf A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 55-56. 
53 Ibid, at 55. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, at 56. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See Accident Compensation Corporation, ACC Levies Due For Payment By 31 May 1989-
Employers, 7 February 1990 -Self-employed (1989) (Mach ACC 3704 0189), 5-6. 
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varied according to the class of vehicle. 59 While there was authority under 
the former Act to engage in experience rating by awarding bonuses and 
assessing penalties to individual employers,60 this authority was not being 
exercised. Statutory authority to impose levies on motor vehicle drivers and 
to impose penalties for poor driving records61 was never exercised.62 
2. The new Act - work injuries 
Under the new Act, employers pay premiums, again adjusted by industry 
class,63 into an employer account which covers only work injuries and 
industrial diseases, not including work-related motor vehicle injuries, of 
employees.64 
3. The new Act - earners' non-work injuries. 
One of the most controversial features of ARCIA is the removal from 
employers of the obligation to fund employees' non-work injuries, and the 
imposition of the obligation to self-insure for such injuries on the employees 
themselves.65 
The initial premium for non-earners is 70 cents per $100 of earnings. 66 
Employers under ARCIA are obligated to withhold premiums from em-
ployees' wages and pay them into the Earners' Account.67 
4. The new Act - motor vehicle accident injuries. 
The costs of motor vehicle accidents will continue to be borne, at least 
in part, by motor vehicle owners through premiums to be paid in conjunc-
tion with the annual registration and licensing of vehicles.68 There is an 
interesting innovation, however - in order "to assist with public health 
costs of injuries arising from motor vehicle accidents" ,69 the Government 
increased the price of' 'motor spirit' '70 by 2 cents per litre and is obligated 
to pay this amount to ARCIC annually for the benefit of the Motor Vehicle 
Account. The avowed purpose of this charge is to "alert individual drivers 
to the real costs of accidents, especially public health costs" .71 
5. The new Act - non-earners' injuries. 
Apart from a new section that permits some non-earners to pay premiums 
for protection against loss of earning capacity,72 benefits for non-earners 
59 Ibid. 
60 ACA 1982, s 40. 
61 Ibid, at s 49(d). 
62 Although recognising the possible advantages by way of deterrence to experience rating, the 
Law Commission ultimately arrived at the conclusion that experience rating and penalties and 
bonuses could not fairly or effectively be imposed. See Law Commission Report No.4, above, 
n 10, at 36-40. 
63 ARCIA, s 103. 
64 Ibid, ss 100, 101. Covered industrial diseases are also included. A unique feature of the new Act 
with regard to employees' work injuries is that an employer may apply for the status of "exempt 
employer": ibid, ss 105-107. If the status is granted by ARCIC the exempt employer becomes, 
in effect, a self insurer with regard to its employee's work injuries for a twelve month period 
following each such injury: ibid, s 106(2). One year following the injury ARCIC assumes the 
obligation with respect to that employee: ibid. The reward to an employer for becoming an exempt 
employer is to have its premium reduced to reflect the cost saving to ARCIC: ibid, s 106(3). The 
status of exempt employer may only be granted for one year at a time: ibid, s 105(1) and (2). 
65 Ibid, ss 113~116. 
66 The Government's initial plan was to set a premium of between $0.50 and $0.70 per $100 of 
earnings, before GST: A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 25. 
67 ARCIA, s 115. 
68 Ibid, silO. 
69 A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 27. 
70 Presumably this includes petrol and other motor vehicle fuels, such as gas. 
71 A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 27. 
72 ARCIA, s 45, discussed above, in n 51. 
8 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 5, 1992] 
who are injured other than in motor vehicle accidents will continue to be 
funded by general tax revenues.73 
6. The new Act - medical misadventure injuries. 
In the former Act health professionals were treated no differently from 
other self-employed persons, occupations, or businesses: their levies were 
based upon their industry class which, in tum, was charged in accordance 
with the injury experience of persons working in that industry. In short, 
premiums were not based on the accidental harm the professional caused 
to patients, but on the injury experience of the professional and the 
professional's employees with regard to their own accidental injuries. In 
consequence, levies to health professionals - who are in a relatively 
non-dangerous profession - tended to be relatively low.74 
The new Act, however, creates a new account known as the Medical 
Misadventure Account,15 Its purpose is to finance benefits required to be 
paid under ARCIA to victims of medical misadventure.76 Premiums are to 
be set by classes of certified health professional as established by regula-
tions.77 Classes may includes different fields of specialisation as well as 
different categories of health professionals.78 Funds to. pay benefits to 
victims of medical misadventure are to be derived from "[a]ny premiums 
that may be payable by registered health professionals of the same class 
as the registered health professional responsible for the medical misadven-
ture".79 
The upshot is that, for the first time since the advent of New Zealand's 
accident compensation scheme, a system of economic accountability to 
third persons - where one class of injury causers will be charged for the 
costs of injuries to persons, other than their own employees, whom they 
have injured - has been inaugurated.80 
7. The new Act - experience rating and internalizing costs. 
The new Act provides for experience rating which may result in "no-
claims bonuses, increased premiums, or claim thresholds" .8) These are 
applicable to all cases in which premiums are to be collected - employers 
(including self-employeds), motor vehicle owners, earners, and persons 
liable to pay medical misadventure premiums.82 While the language pro-
73 Ibid, s 120. . 
74 Thus, for exarnple, the levy for those in the practice of medicine that was due on February 7, 
1990, was $1.35 per $100 of payroll. By way of comparison, the levy for someone in the milk 
distribution business was $2.75, in the millinery retailing business $1.65, and in the scrap metal 
business $11.00. Accident Compensation Corporation, ACC Levies Due For Payment By 31 
May 1989-Employers, 7 February 1990-Selfemployed(1989) (MachACC 3704 0189), 37. 
75 ARC1A, ss 122-24. 
76 Ibid, s 122(1). 
77 Ibid, s 123(5). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, s 122(1)(a). Sub (b). provides: "Where there is no such premium, from the Earners' 
Account (in the case ofan earner) or the Non-Earners' Account (m the case of a non-earner),'. 
Presumably this subsection will apply when there is no class specified for a particular certified 
health professional and therefore no special premiums collected from members of that class. 
80 It is interesting to note that the concept of a special medical misadventure fund was not 
specifically mentioned by Mr Birch, the Minister of Labour responsible for the accident 
compensation scheme, as late as 30 July 1991 when he promulgated his report on the future of 
the scheme. See A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6. He did note, however: "There has been criticism 
ofthe scheme arising from the inadequacy of alternative means of calling medical practitioners 
to account for alleged negligence. There will be no return to the right to sue; instead, the 
Government will introduce legislation to effect changes in disciplinary procedures for the 
medical profession". Ibid, at 31. . 
8) ARClA, ss 104, Ill, 116 and 124. 
82 Ibid. 
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viding for experience rating for earners, self-employeds, motor vehicle 
owners, and health professionals appears to be discretionary, using the 
word "may", the section dealing with experience rating of individual 
employers "on the basis of the actual costs of work injuries that occur in 
the employment of that employer" seems to be mandatory, using the word 
"shall" . 83 
With regard to premiums on employers the Government felt that expe-
rience rating would overcome the' 'problem of broad industry classifica-
tions" and regarded "[t]he introduction of experience rating [to be] an 
essential part of the change in emphasis towards an insurance scheme 
funded by premiums" .84 
Apart from the fairness that might be associated with experience rating, 
there is some indication that the Government was concerned also with 
deterrence of accidents. Thus, for example, with regard to the assessment 
of a motor vehicle fuel tax, Mr Birch stated: 
While impacting on all road users, this premium is expected to have a particular impact on 
young drivers, especially 16 to 24 year old males. This group has a particularly high accident 
rate and therefore has a disproportionate effect on public health costs. They often drive 
vehicles owned by others, such as their parents, and this additional premium will impact on 
them directly when they purchase petrol.85 
V. CRITIQUE 
At an international workshop entitled "Beyond Compensation: Dealing 
With Accidents in the 21 st Century" ,86 Geoffrey Palmer, who was heavily 
involved with Woodhouse J in the development of the original New 
Zealand scheme,87 suggested that the new Act "hasn't got any coherent 
thinking in it at all. It is really unprincipled mishmash ... ". 88 Is that a fair 
reading of the new Act? 
First, it should be understood that the former Act was seen by its framers 
as just a way-station on the road to a perfect collective or welfare approach 
to disability.89 That the scheme did not purport to cover incapacity by 
reason of illness was in their view only a temporary problem based on 
expediency, to be righted as soon as practicable. The recent election of the 
National Party, however, prevented the ultimate step, or at least a step 
toward a more comprehensive plim, as exemplified by the Labour Govern-
ment's Rehabilitation and Incapacity Bill, from being taken. 
Quite clearly the new Act is not viewed by its sponsors as a social 
insurance scheme, but as a scheme providing comprehensive accident 
insurance. From this perspective, therefore, the retention of tax-funded 
benefits for non-earners is clearly anomalous, since those benefits are only 
consistent with a welfare scheme. But this is not too drastic a deviation 
from the new philosophy because the benefits paid to non-earners, even 
including the new $40 per week independence allowance, do not include 
much if anything by way of disability income and undoubtedly only 
constitute, as they always have, a relatively small part of the scheme. 
83 ARCIA, s 104(1). 
84 A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 24. 
85 Ibid, at 27. 
86 March 22-24,1992, East-West Centre, Honolulu, Hawaii. The proceedings have been accepted 
for publication in the University of Hawaii Law Review. 
87 See Geoffrey Palmer, Accident Compensation: A Study of Law and Social Change in New 
Zealand and Australia, passim (1979). 
88 Volume 2, Proceedings of March 23,1992, at 26, unpublished. 
89 See The Woodhouse Report, above, n 9, at 26; Report No.4, above, n 10, at 7-10. 
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Indeed, the poor treatment of non-earners, especially after depriving them 
of their civil actions for personal injuries, seems to constitute a serious area 
of injustice in the New Zealand scheme. Unfortunately, that has not 
changed very much under the new Act. 
It does appear that the scheme, although provided in a single statute, 
embodies five distinctive compensation schemes: 
First, as just described, a modest welfare scheme for injured non-earners. 
Second, a fairly classical workers' compensation scheme covering 
accident and industrial disease arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment and funded almost entirely by employers. While the scheme is rather 
generous in terms of earnings-related compensation, however, it will 
henceforth require injured employees to pay user-costs in order to get some 
of their health benefits. This is less generous than most workers' compen-
sation schemes in the United States, which usually cover all medical and 
rehabilitative expenses. 
The new "exempt employer" provision seems similar, but not as 
far-reaching, as permission under most workers' compensation acts for 
qualified employers to self-insure or, at least, for employers to purchase 
insurance from private insurers. 
Viewed, in isolation as a separate system, therefore, there is nothing very 
exceptional about the provisions for compensation to earners for work 
injuries. 
Third, the provisions dealing with compensation and premiums for 
earners' non-work injuries constitute a first-party accident insurance 
scheme. The differences from other private schemes are that this scheme 
is mandated by the Government; that the coverage is relatively compre-
hensive, including disability income, health and other benefits rather than 
just lump sums or just disability income; and that a Government corpora-
tion, ARCIC, stands in for the private insurers who might otherwise offer 
such insurance.9o 
Fourth, the scheme with regard to motor vehicle accidents constitutes a 
total no-fault motor vehicle accident scheme. Presumably, it too will be 
fully funded by user charges, including the premiums to be paid by owners 
and the fuel tax to be paid by drivers and owners who purchase the fuel. 
The amounts collected from these sources will be used fully to pay for the 
scheme, including the public health costs. 
Fifth, the new provisions dealing with medical misadventure seem to 
establish a quasi-medical malpractice action. Under the former Act it was 
necessary for the claimant to establish "medical, surgical, dental, or first 
aid misadventure" ,91 which was not otherwise defined in the Act. As 
Margaret Vennel1 has wel1 described, there has been considerable diffi-
culty in determining what kind of acts, omissions, or other medically-re-
lated misfortunes constitute medical misadventure.92 While proof of 
medical error amounting to a breach of the appropriate standard of care 
has increasingly been deemed relevant by judges to the question of medical 
90 There is evidently an intention on the part of the Government, however, to give further 
consideration to a greater role for private insurers. See A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 61. 
Further, it might be possible, although the issue has evidently not been addressed, to permit an 
employer to become exempt and self-insure under ss 105 and 106 of ARCIA by purchasing 
insurance from a private carrier. 
91 ACA 1982, s 2(1). 
92 Margaret A M Yennell, Medical Injury Compensation Under the New Zealand Accident 
Compensation Scheme and Medical Responsibility, (1992) (monograph) (hereinafter Medical 
Injury Compensation). 
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misadventure in both omission-to-act93 and in othercases,94 such proof was 
not relevant in every case.95 It also remained at least theoretically possible 
to define medical misadventure in all cases in a way that focussed on the 
accidental nature of the injury to the victim rather than on the fault of the 
medical professional. Under the new Act, however, a fault requirement has 
expressly been inserted into the framework of the accident compensation 
system. With the exception of those who claim "medical mishap", which 
as restrictively defined in the Act is likely to constitute a small minority 
of claims,96 all other medical misadventure claimants, to prevail, must 
evidently establish "medical error" ,97 which in tum requires proof of 
negligence - malpractice.98 
These provisions requiring proof of medical negligence when consid-
ered in connection with other new provisions that give the medical profes-
sional an opportunity to be heard,99 that require that the decision-making 
body have expert advice,IOo that require findings of medical negligence or 
other inappropriate action to be reported to a disciplinary or other body,101 
that call for experience rating of premiums paid by health professionals, 102 
and that permit claimants and health professionals dissatisfied with a 
decision of ARCIC to request a review of the decision and to appeal the 
decision of the reviewer through the courts,103 appear to create what is 
93 Ibid, at 13-16. 
94 Ibid, at 20-21, discussing, inter alia, Buckley v Accident Compensation Corporation, 24 
November 1988, ACAA, 275/88, Middleton DCJ (failure to treat with appropriate antibiotics); 
Vernon v Accident Compensation Corporation, 13 January 1989, ACAA, 1189, Blackwood BH 
(continued prescription of a dangerous drug to an alcoholic); Hata v Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 30 April 1990, ACAA, 100/90, Cartwright PJ (failure to warn of the risk of a 
sterilisation operation); and Tiddy v Accident Compensation Corporation, 15 May 1990, 
ACAA, 11/90, Middleton A W (failure of a vasectomy operation and failure to warn of dangers 
of unprotected intercourse). 
95 See eg ibid, at 19, describing Polansky v Accident Compensation Corporation (1986) 5 NZAR 
276 (" a misdiagnosis of an 'extensive carcinoma' followed by the unnecessary removal of the 
entire stomach, distal oesophagus (sic), spleen and distal half of the pancreas", although not 
negligent, constituted medical misadventure). 
96 ARCIA, s 5(1)-(4): see above, n 23. 
97 Ibid, s 5(1). Since personal injury caused by an accident is a separate ground for cover, a patient 
who suffers injury during treatment may not have to establish medical misadventure if she can 
show that she suffered injury caused by an accident, (s 8(2)(a)), or personal injury which was 
a consequence of treatment for personal injury, (s 8(2)(d». Presumably, injury by accident can 
be established without proof of medical.misadventure, for example, by proving that the patient 
suffered injury when a surgical instrument broke while within her body cavity. See, for example, 
the facts of Anderson v Somberg (1975) 67 NJ 191,338 A 2d I, cert. denied, 423 US 929 (the 
tip of an angulated pituitary rongeur broke off while the tool was being manipulated in plaintiff's 
sp,inalcanal). 
98 'Medical error" is defined as "the failure of a registered health professional to observe a 
standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances": ARCIA, s 5(1). 
Section 5(6) of ARCIA disallows claims for failure to obtain informed consent unless "the 
registered health professional acted negligently in failing to obtain informed consent". Section 
5(7) disallows claims for injury based on failure to diagnose the medical condition correctly or 
failure to provide treatment "unless the failure is negligent". 
99 ARCIA, s 5(10)(a). 
100 Ibid, s 5(9). 
101 Ibid, s 5(10)(b). 
102 Ibid, s 124. 
103 Section 5(1O)(a) of ARCIA provides that a health professional has a right to "comment" to 
ARCIC where medical misadventure may be attributable to negligence or other inappropriate 
action. Section 89(3) provides that a registered health professional dissatisfied with a decision 
involving negligent failure to diagnose an illness or provide treatment (s 5(7», or negligent 
failure to obtain informed consent (s 5(6)), may apply to ARCIC for a review of the decision. 
And s 90(4)(c) allows the professional in such cases "to be present and be heard either 
personally or by a representative". However, the situations referred to in s 89(3) seem to exclude 
many, indeed probably most, other possible cases of medical error where negligence in 
treatment occurs within s 5( I). Section 91 allows any person permitted to apply for review under 
s 89(3) to appeal to a District Court. Section 97 permits an appeal of that decision to the High 
Court. Questions oflaw may then be appealed to the Court of Appeal on leave of the High Court 
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likely to become a highly adversarial proceeding or series of proceedings 
in which the issue is whether the tort of medical negligence has been 
committed! 
This development, in tum, raises serious questions about the difficulties, 
costs, and delays a claimant will be likely to experience in seeking 
compensation for medical error. First, as Venne II has noted, "There is a 
possible danger that if the Accident Compensation Corporation becomes 
involved in the complaint procedure that injured patients will be disadvan-
taged" }04 In a medical community as small as New Zealand's, it may be 
difficult to find expert witnesses to testify on a claimant's behalf. Second, 
there is a problem of affordability of legal costs. Although wrongful 
conduct or omissions on the part of the health professional will have to be 
established as in a civil medical malpractice action, the awards are not 
likely to come close to matching the large damages available in a conven-
tional tort action for malpractice. Claimants ineligible for legal aid may 
find legal representation excessively expensive, and may in any event not 
find the benefits worth the anguish of pressing the claim. Finally, there is 
the problem of delays. Those claiming medical error who might receive 
significant benefits if their claim is approved may have to wait for extended 
periods while their claims wend their way through the courts. From the 
point of view of compensation to accident victims, therefore, the medical 
misadventure provisions leave much to be desired. One is tempted to 
charaCterize the new medical misadventure scheme as a miscegenetic 
union of fault and no fault, grossly unfair to many victims of medical error. 
There is, however, a potentially positive aspect to the new Act: the 
attempt to reassert accountability through experience rating. It has been 
my view that the former Act significantly undermined deterrence of 
accidents by externalizing accident costs and by eliminating the concept 
of negligence or fault with regard to personal injuries from the public 
consciousness. lOS Under the new Act, experience rating is mandatory for 
work injuries and may be inaugurated for all other categories where 
premiums are required. This reflects an intention to internalize the .costs 
of accidents, and that intention is praiseworthy. Unfortunately, there may 
be insurmountable difficulties in attempting fairly to experience rate 
individual New Zealand employers,106 and even greater problems may 
arise with regard to experience rating of individual earners. On the other 
hand, as is the case with motorists in the United States, rates might 
profitably be increased for those motor vehicle owners whose vehicles 
have been involved in the violation of traffic laws. 
With regard to medical misadventure, to the extent that findings of 
negligence are now required for recovery in cases of medical misadven-
ture, experience rating of health professionals may fairly be imposed.107 
or the Court of Appeal: s 98. 
104 Medical Injury Compensation, above, n 92, at 24. See also Gellhorn, "Medical Malpractice 
Litigation (US) - Medical Mishap Compensation (NZ)", (1988) 73 Cornell L Rev 170, 
197-202. 
lOS See "The Future", above, n 8, at 78-80. 
106 See New Zealand Law Commission, Comment on "The Future of New Zealand's Accident 
Compensation Scheme" by Richard S Miller, (1990) 12 U Haw L Rev 339, 341; Report No. 
4, above, n 10, at 36-40. 
107 That is, if the medical professional whose premium is increased because ofnegJigence is actually 
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. That would include the right to be rerresented by 
counsel, to testify, to present witnesses, and to participate fully through counse on appeals. 
That is probably the case under the new Act: s 90(4)(a) allows any person dissatisfied with a 
premium assessment, who seeks review as permitted in s 89(4), to be present and to be heard 
personally or by a representative. Section 91 allows any person permitted to apply for review 
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Such increased premiums could serve to deter health provider negligence. 
It is unfortunate, however, that it is the nature of the new system, as 
described above, to discourage the bringing of even justified medical 
misadventure claims. Increases in premiums, therefore, are not likely to 
come close to matching the actual costs of medical error. 
It has been my view, set forth in my 1989 article,108 that the best way to 
reintroduce deterrence into the New Zealand system would be to allow the 
corporation which administers the system and the claimant to bring tort 
actions against persons who caused the injuries for which compensation 
is granted. Ifmy approach were adopted, the corporation, ARCIC, would 
through subrogation seek to recover the value of benefits paid and to be 
paid under ARCIA from tortfeasors; the individual could seek to recover 
tort damages not compensated by ARCIC. In the event of settlement, 
ARCIC's claims would be primary.109 Even though the new Act has 
reintroduced tort-like considerations in the area of medical injuries, and 
even though some provisions of the Act denying cover may reopen the 
door to full-scale tort actions that courts will allow,11O the Government 
clings to the view that it is not reintroducing the tort system. I II 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Fairness . 
The scheme continues to exhibit serious unfairness to non-earners. 
Neither the new independence allowance or the election to purchase 
benefits for loss of earning capacity seem adequately to compensate 
non-earners who lose significant future earning capacity by reason of 
accident. This unfairness, as is often the case, is most likely to have its 
adverse effect on women who are raising children or working at low-pay-
ingjobs, or both, at the time they suffer their accidental harm. There is also 
serious unfairness, as pointed out above, to claimants seeking compensa-
tion for medical error, by virtue of the hurdles they must jump and the costs 
they may have to incur before their entitlement to compensation is estab-
lished. 
There is other evidence of unfairness: before the original scheme was 
adopted employers were liable for workers' compensation and also subject 
to tort actions by their employees and, most importantly, to tort actions, 
such as product liability actions, brought by persons, other than employees, 
injured by employers. A significant trade-off produced by the adoption of 
that scheme was that in exchange for immunity from tort actions brought 
by workers and by others, employers would cover their workers for 
non-work-related as well as work-related accidents. Further, the availabil-
under s 89(4) to appeal to a District Court. Section 97 permits an appeal of that decision to the 
High Court. Questions oflaw may then be appealed to the Court of Appeal on leave of the High 
Court or the Court of Appeal: s 98. 
108 "The Future", above, n 8, at 63-73. 
109 For greater detail see ibid. 
110 Recall that tort actions are only disallowed in situations where ARCIA provides cover. There 
are situations, such as where cover for mental distress unaccompanied by physical injury is not 
provided (see ss 4(1) and 8(3)), or where negligence or intentional wrongs involved in drug 
trials or clinical trials are excluded in cases where claimant agreed in writing to participate in 
the trials (s 5(8)), where the courts may well allow a tort recovery. 
III A Fairer Scheme, above, n 6, at 1. It is interesting to note that the Act expressly provides for 
rights of subrogation for ARCIC in those few cases where the accident victim retains a right of 
action at law: ARCIA, s 15. It would be relatively easy to require general subrogation simply 
by expanding this section of the Act and amending s 14, which bars tort actions for damages 
with respect to personal injury for which the Act provides cover. 
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ity of lump-sum payments for non-economic loss, although limited in 
amount, constituted another element of the trade-off, since accident vic-
tims were giving up their right at common law to recover for pain and 
suffering. In the new scheme the employee has been deprived of both the 
lump sum payment and the employer's payment to cover non-work 
accidents, and these fairly significant benefits have been replaced only by 
an insignificant independence allowance of up to $40 per week. On the 
other hand, employers remain exempt from both worker law suits and from 
personal injury actions brought by others. To put it more starkly, while the 
benefits paid for by employers have been significantly reduced, they 
remain immune from product liability actions and from other tort actions 
arising out of personal injuries to third persons. In effect, therefore, 
employers, who undoubtedly include manufacturing companies, agricul-
tural producers, service companies, landlords, and all non-health profes-
sionals, are having the costs of accidents negligently caused by them 
subsidized both by accident victims and by workers who now pay individ-
ual premiums. From a global perspective, this will increase the subsidy 
produced by immunity to personal injury tort liability already given to New 
Zealand producers of products and services sold in international markets 
and further increase their competitive advantage against firmsfrom nations 
which allow liability claims by injured persons. 
2. Philosophy 
It is true that no clear philosophy supports the five compensation 
systems encompassed by the new Act. Using five "models for the man-
agement of risk and its consequences" suggested by Stephen Sugarman,112 
the non-earner provisions are still based on collective welfare notions, but 
the rejection of equal coverage for illness-caused disability is anti-collec-
tivist and illiberal. The workers' compensation feature, financed by em-
ployers, fits the liberal model. The compulsory non-work injury accident 
insurance scheme for workers is a curious hybrid: authoritarian in its 
mandatory feature and collectivist in its administration by a state-run 
corporation, but conservative if not libertarian in having workers cover the 
costs through premiums. The semi-fault-based medical misadventure 
scheme begins to move in a conservative direction by requiring proof of 
fault in most cases and possibly by imposing the costs of medical error on 
health care providers through experience rating, but it is liberal to the 
extent that claims are initially handled administratively, that medical 
mishap is not based on fault, and that compensation is limited. Similarly, 
the intention to experience-rate the premiums for the entire system and to 
require payment of user charges for medical and hospital benefits consti-
tute a further distancing from a collectivist welfare scheme. From this 
perspective, therefore, the new Act does, indeed, seem to constitute an 
unprincipled mishmash. 
There is, however, evidence of ail overarching anti-collectivist theme, 
one that seems to be based principally on a conservative view of the needs 
of New Zealand's economic situation: with the glaring exception of 
non-earner accidents, the accident compensation system and the public 
health system upon which it draws to serve accident victims is increasingly 
to be financed by premiums, user charges, and motor fuel taxes paid by 
112 The models are libertarian, conservative, liberal, collective, and socialist. See "Proceedings of 
International Workshop: Beyond Compensation - Dealing with Accidents in the Twenty-First 
Century", accepted for publication in the University of Hawaii Law Review. 
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individuals and finns and not by general taxation. In other words, with the 
sole exception of compensation for non-earners, the National Government 
is in the process of removing the costs of the accident compensation 
scheme from the general tax rolls where the Law Commission and the 
Labour Government would have preferred to have them put. This clearly 
reflects an exodus from the principle of community or collective respon-
sibility which guided the fonner scheme. 
3. Accident policy 
From a policy perspective, however, applying political labels is not 
nearly as significant as the extent to which the new scheme serves or 
disserves important values. In the case of an accident compensation 
scheme, well-being is clearly the primary value. Well-being may be served 
in two ways: (1) by compensating accident victims, and (2) by preventing 
and deterring accidents. 113 
a. Compensation 
With regard to earnings-related compensation, i.e. income replacement 
for earners, the new Act seems to provide compensation about as adequate 
and as timely as that provided in the prior Act. For most earners that 
compensation should continue to prove very adequate to replace lost 
earnings, even without lump sum payments for noneconomic loss. The 
plight of injured non-earners, because they have lost the right to receive 
lump-sums for non-economic loss, seems on the whole worse than under 
the prior Act notwithstanding the availability of a meagre independence 
allowance and limited optional insurance. The well-being of most victims 
of medical misadventure is likely to diminish significantly compared with 
their situation under the prior Act: Those claiming medical error may find 
themselves embroiled in a contentious, if not adversarial, process subject 
to several appeals which may either delay their recovery or result in a denial 
of compensation altogether if fault is not proven. Few will qualify to 
recover under the highly restricted claim of medical mishap. Finally, with 
regard to hospital, medical, and surgical expenses, accident victims will 
henceforth face' 'user part charges" and maximum limits on payments by 
ARCIC for private hospitalisation which could have the effect of reducing 
victims' access to necessary heafthcare. 
b. Deterrence 
The intention to internalize accident costs is commendable. Notwith-
standing doubts about the effectiveness of experience rating as a deterrent 
and its fairness to small finns and individuals, the possibility that a poor 
accident record can lead to higher premiums could reintroduce a greater 
consciousness of the need for safety and accident prevention into the 
national psyche - a consciousness that in my opinion has diminished since 
the advent of the accident compensation scheme. Because of those doubts, 
however, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent experience rating 
will actually be carried out. 
Althoughthe changes to medical misadventure are likely to undennine 
the comprehensiveness of the accident compensation scheme, they are, 
ironically, likely to strengthen considerably deterrence and injury preven-
tion in the case of health professionals, at least for the near tenn. Once it 
113 Calabresi would refer to these as reducing secondary and primary accident costs respectively. 
Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970), 26-28. 
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is learned that findings. of medical error are to be reported to professional 
disciplinary bodies and that determinations of medical error can result in 
payment ofhigher premiums, health professionals can be expected to react 
by undertaking greater care in the provision of health services. Indeed, it 
would not be a surprise to hear complaints that physicians are beginning 
to practice" defensive medicine" in order to avoid claims of medical error. 
On the other hand, once the weaknesses and ineffectiveness of the scheme, 
from the point of view of a claimant alleging medical misadventure, 
become understood, the deterrent effect is likely to decline. 
Notwithstanding the confusion of principles and the weakness of deter-
rence, it is likely that the New Zealand scheme, as it has been amended by 
ARCIA, will become as to most of its features even more attractive as a 
substitute for the tort system than the former Act. First, the workers' 
compensation scheme is already in place in developed nations. Second, 
the worker-financed non-work-accident insurance scheme with employer 
withholding of premiums seems a relatively painless way to finance 
compensation for such injuries. Third, the total no-fault motor vehicle 
injury scheme financed by owner premiums and in part by taxes on motor 
fuel may not appear too radical a departure in jurisdictions that are familiar 
with partial motor vehicle no-fault schemes. 1I4 When to this mix is added 
the perceived, if illusory, savings achieved by eliminating all personal 
liability and liability insurance for personal injury, the adoption of such a 
scheme, including even the limited but "free" benefits for non-earners, 
may appear very attractive to all but personal injury lawyers and those, 
like this commentator, who are concerned about deterrence of accidents 
and efficiency. Adoption of such a system to replace an ongoing tort 
system without provision for a tort liability back-up would in my opinion 
be most unfortunate} 15 
As to medical misadventure, the fact that New Zealand, the leading 
proponent of no-fault accident compensation among the developed na-
tions, has rejected its own no-fault approach for dealing with medical error 
and reintroduced fault - medical negligence - as a basis for compensation, 
could have a dampening effect on efforts, such as those in the United 
States, 116 to replace medical malpractice with a no-fault system. 
114 Quebec has already adopted a total automobile no-fault scheme. See O'Connor & Tenser, 
"North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law: Quebec's Auto Insurance Act", (1987) 24 
San Diego L Rev 917. The study which led to Hawaii's adoption of a partial no-fault plan for 
automobile accidents had recommended a "pure" no-fault scheme. See Haldi Associates, Inc., 
A Study of Hawaii's Motor Vehicle Insurance Program (1972) 119, 127. 
115 See "The Future", above, n 8, at 63-80. . 
116 The American Law Institute, Reporter's Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 
Vol II, 487-516 (1991). In Hawaii a Governor's Blue Ribbon Committee "has made a no-fault 
malpractice system for Hawaii one of its top priorities for reining in health care costs". Kevin 
Dayton, "Doubts on no-fault in medicine; Hawaii doctors, nurses skeptical about changing 
system", Aug. 28, 1992, Honolulu Advertiser, at A2. 
